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Abstract
In this paper, we extend and improve the production chain model introduced by
Kikuchi et al. (2018). Utilizing the theory of monotone concave operators, we
prove the existence, uniqueness, and global stability of equilibrium price, hence
improving their results on production networks with multiple upstream partners.
We propose an algorithm for computing the equilibrium price function that is
more than ten times faster than successive evaluations of the operator. The
model is then generalized to a stochastic setting that offers richer implications
for the distribution of firms in a production network.
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1. Introduction
Over the past several centuries, firms have self-organized into ever more
complex production networks, spanning both state and international boundaries,
and constructing and delivering a vast range of manufactured goods and services.
The structures of these networks help determine the efficiency (Levine, 2012;
Ciccone, 2002) and resilience (Carvalho, 2007; Jones, 2011; Bigio and LaO, 2016;
Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2015a) of the entire economy, and also provide new insights
into the directions of trade and financial policies (Baldwin and Venables, 2013;
Acemoglu et al., 2015b).
We consider a production chain model introduced by Kikuchi et al. (2018)
that examines the formation of such structures. They connect the literature
on firm networks and network structure to the underlying theory of the firm.
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In particular, the model in Kikuchi et al. (2018) formalizes the foundational
ideas on the theory of the firm presented in Coase (1937), embedding them in
an equilibrium model with a continuum of price taking firms, and providing
mathematical representations of the determinants of firm boundaries suggested
by Coase (1937).
A single firm at the end of the production chain sells a final product to
consumers. The firm can choose to produce the whole product by itself or
subcontract a portion of it to possible multiple upstream partners, who then
make similar choices until all the remaining production is completed. The main
reason for firms to produce more in-house is to save the transaction costs of
buying intermediate products from the market. In fact, Coase (1937) regards
this as the primary force that brings firms into existence. An opposing force that
limits the size of a firm is the costs of organizing production within the firm1. A
price function governs the choices firms make and is determined endogenously in
equilibrium when every firm in the production chain makes zero profit.
Considering that all firms are ex ante identical, a notable feature of this
model is its ability to generate a production network with multiple layers of
firms different in their sizes and numbers of upstream partners. The source of
the heterogeneity lies solely in the transaction costs and firms’ different stages
in the production chain. This feature provides insights into the formation of
potentially more complex structures in a production network. Kikuchi et al.
(2018) prove the existence, uniqueness, and global stability2 of the equilibrium
price function restricting every firm to have only one upstream partner. In this
case, the resulting production network consists of a single chain.
There are however, several significant weaknesses with the analysis in Kikuchi
et al. (2018). First, while they provide comprehensive results on uniqueness of
equilibrium prices and convergence of successive approximations in the single
upstream partner case, they fail to provide analogous results for the more inter-
esting multiple upstream partner case, presumably due to technical difficulties.
Second, their model cannot accurately reflect the data on observed production
networks because their networks are always symmetric, with sub-networks at
each layer being exact copies of one another. Real production networks do not
exhibit this symmetry3. Third, they provide no effective algorithm for computing
the equilibrium price function in the multiple upstream partner case.
This paper resolves all of the shortcomings listed above. As our first contri-
bution, we extend their existence, uniqueness, and global stability results to the
multiple partner case. To avoid the technical difficulties faced in their paper, we
employ a different approach utilizing the theory of monotone concave operators,
which enables us to give a unified proof for both cases.
Theoretically, the concave operator theory ensures the global stability of the
1One justification also mentioned in Kikuchi et al. (2018) is that firms usually experience
diminishing return to management: when a firm gets bigger it also bears increasing coordination
costs. See also Coase (1937), Lucas (1978), and Becker and Murphy (1992).
2Mathematically, the equilibrium price function is determined as the fixed point of a Bellman
like operator (see Section 3). Globally stability means that the fixed point can be computed
by successive evaluations of the operator on any function in a certain function space.
3For instance, for a mobile phone manufacturer, most subcontractors who supply complicated
components like display or CPUs have multiple upstream partners of their own, while those
who supply raw materials usually don’t (Dedrick et al., 2011; Kraemer et al., 2011).
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fixed point, so the equilibrium price function can be computed by successive
evaluations of the operator. In practice, however, the rates of convergence
can be different for different model settings. This leads to unnecessarily long
computation time in most cases. As a second contribution, we propose an
algorithm that achieves fast computation regardless of parameterizations and is
shown to drastically reduce computation time in our simulations.
A third contribution of this paper is that we generalize the model to a
stochastic setting. In the original model, the equilibrium firm allocation is
symmetric and deterministic: firms at the same stage of production choose the
exact same number of upstream partners. In reality, each firm faces uncertainty
in the contracting process and cannot always choose the optimal number of
partners. We model the number of upstream partners as a Poisson distribution
and let the firm choose its parameter, which can be seen as a search effort. Using
the same approach, we prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium price
function as well as the validity of the algorithm. We further use simulations
to analyze how production and transaction costs determine the shape of a
production network. This generalization provides a new source of heterogeneity
in the equilibrium firm allocation and can be a potential channel for future
research on size distribution of firms.
As briefly mentioned above, the method we use to establish the existence,
uniqueness, and global stability of the equilibrium price function draws on the
theory of concave operators. A competing method traditionally used for the
same purpose is the Contraction Mapping Theorem, which has been an essential
tool for economists dealing with various dynamic models ever since Bellman
(1957). So long as the operator in question satisfies the contraction property, we
can quickly compute a unique fixed point by applying the operator successively.
This property, simple as it may be, is not shared among a number of important
models, urging us to find new tools to tackle fixed point problems in economic
dynamics.
The theory of monotone concave operators originally due to Krasnosel’skii
(1964, Chapter 6) is another simple yet powerful tool. The idea behind it is
intuitive: imagine an increasing and strictly concave real function f such that
f(x1) > x1 and f(x2) < x2 with x1 < x2. Then it must be true that f has a
unique fixed point on [x1, x2], and by the concavity of f , the fixed point can
be computed by successive evaluations of f on any x ∈ [x1, x2]. No contraction
property is needed here while we still get all the results from the Contraction
Mapping Theorem. A full-fledged theorem owing to Du (1989) for arbitrary
Banach spaces is stated in Theorem 3.1. For similar treatments4 in the math
literature, also see Krasnoselskii et al. (1972), Krasnosel’skii and Zabre˘iko (1984),
Guo and Lakshmikantham (1988), Guo et al. (2004), and Zhang (2013).
Apart from Theorem 3.1, there are other similar techniques that utilize
concavity to show uniqueness5 of the fixed point. Krasnosel’skii (1964) shows
4We thank an anonymous referee for referring us to some of the works mentioned here.
5The existence of fixed points can be tackled in various ways. For the operator T , existence
has already been proved in Kikuchi et al. (2018) who use the classical Knaester–Tarski
fixed point theorem. Alternatively, it can be proved, as an anonymous referee suggests, by
demonstrating that T is completely continuous (see, e.g., Krasnosel’skii, 1964, Chapter 4).
The Schauder typed fixed point theorems also apply; see, for example, Section 7.1 in Cheney
(2013).
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that a monotone operator on a positive cone has at most one nonzero fixed point
if the operator satisfies a concavity condition (u0-concave). For applications of
this technique in the economic literature, see, for example, Lacker and Schreft
(1991) and Becker and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2017). Following Krasnosel’skii (1964),
Coleman (1991) proves uniqueness under slightly different concavity and mono-
tonicity conditions (pseudo-concave and x0-monotone). See also Datta et al.
(2002b), Datta et al. (2002a), and Morand and Reffett (2003) for other economic
applications along this line.
Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010, 2017) link concavity to contraction in the
Thompson metric (Thompson, 1963), which allows one to apply the Contraction
Mapping Theorem to operators that are not contractive under the supnorm.
In a similar vein, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2017) establish existence and
uniqueness results for monotone operators under a range of weaker concavity
conditions using Tarski-type fixed point theorems and the Thompson metric.
Among all of these results, the theorem by Du (1989) turns out to be the most
suitable for our work.
The monotone concave operator theory has seen some recent success in the
economic literature. Lacker and Schreft (1991) study an economy with cash and
trade credit as means of payment and show that the equilibrium interest rate
is a unique fixed point of a monotone concave operator. Coleman (1991, 2000)
studies the equilibrium in a production economy with income tax and proves the
existence and uniqueness of consumption function by constructing a monotone
concave map. Following this approach, Datta et al. (2002b) prove the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium in a large class of dynamic economies with capital
and elastic labor supply. Similar work in the same vein includes Morand and
Reffett (2003) and Datta et al. (2002a). Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodr´ıguez-Palmero
(2003) exploit the monotonicity and convexity properties of the Bellman operator
and give conditions for existence and uniqueness of fixed points in the case of
unbounded returns. Balbus et al. (2013) study the existence and uniqueness
of pure strategy Markovian equilibrium using theories concerning decreasing
and “mixed concave” operators. More recently, this theory has been applied
extensively to models with recursive utilities since Marinacci and Montrucchio
(2010); other contributions6 along this line include Balbus (2016), Borovicˇka
and Stachurski (2017, 2018), Becker and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2017), Marinacci and
Montrucchio (2017), Pavoni et al. (2018), Bloise and Vailakis (2018), and Ren
and Stachurski (2018).
Our work connects to this literature in that the operator which determines
the equilibrium price is shown to be increasing and concave but does not satisfy
any contraction property. To prove existence and uniqueness, Kikuchi et al.
(2018) use an ad hoc and convoluted method for the case when every firm can
only have one upstream partner but fail to generalize it to the multiple partner
case. Using the monotone concave operator theory, we are able to extend their
results and give a much simpler proof.
Section 2 describes the model in detail. Section 3 introduces the monotone
concave operator theory and gives existence and uniqueness results. The algo-
rithm is described in Section 4. Section 5 generalizes the model, allowing for
6Among these works, Balbus (2016), Borovicˇka and Stachurski (2017), and Ren and
Stachurski (2018) use versions of fixed point theorems similar to Theorem 3.1 in this paper.
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stochastic choices of upstream partners. Section 6 concludes. All proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We study the production chain model with multiple partners in Kikuchi et al.
(2018). The chain consists of a single firm at the end of the chain which sells a
single final good to consumers and firms at different stages of the production,
each of which sells an intermediate good to a downstream firm by producing the
good in-house or subcontracting a portion of the production process to possibly
multiple upstream firms. We index the stage of production by s ∈ X = [0, 1]
with 1 being the final stage. Each firm faces a price function p : X → R+
and a cost function c : X → R+. Subcontracting incurs a transaction cost
that is proportionate7 to the price with coefficient δ > 1 for each upstream
partner and an additive transaction cost g : N→ R+ that is a function of the
number of upstream partners. The cost g can be seen as the costs of maintaining
partnerships such as legal expenses and communication costs.
We adopt the same assumptions as in Kikuchi et al. (2018). For the cost
function c, we assume that c(0) = 0 and it is differentiable, strictly increasing,
and strictly convex. In other words, each firm experiences diminishing return
to management as mentioned in the introduction. This assumption is needed
here because otherwise no firm would want to subcontract its production. We
also assume c′(0) > 0. For the additive transaction cost function g, we assume
that it is strictly increasing, g(1) = 0, and g(k) goes to infinity as the number of
upstream partners k goes to infinity. To summarize, we have the following two
assumptions.
Assumption 2.1. The cost function c is differentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly convex. It also satisfies c(0) = 0 and c′(0) > 0.
Assumption 2.2. The additive transaction cost function g is strictly increasing,
g(1) = 0, and g(k)→∞ as k →∞.
Therefore, a firm at stage s solves the following problem:
min
t≤s
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp(t/k)} . (1)
In (1), the firm chooses to produce s−t in-house with cost c(s−t) and subcontract
t to k upstream partners. Since each subcontractor is in charge of t/k part of
the product, this results in a proportionate transaction cost δkp(t/k) and an
additive transaction cost g(k). Then the firm sells the product to its downstream
firm at price p(s).
3. Equilibrium
Following Kikuchi et al. (2018), we consider the equilibrium in a competitive
market with free entry and free exit. The price adjusts so that in the long run
7Here we follow Kikuchi et al. (2018). This transaction cost can be the cost of gathering
information, drafting contract, bargaining, or even tax, all of which tend to increase with the
volume of the transaction.
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every firm makes zero profit. The equilibrium price function then satisfies
p(s) = min
t≤s
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp(t/k)} . (2)
Let R(X) be the space of real functions and C(X) the space of continuous
functions on X. Then we can define an operator T : C(X)→ R(X) by
Tp(s) := min
t≤s
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp(t/k)} . (3)
The equilibrium price function is thus determined as the fixed point of the
operator T .
3.1. Monotone Concave Operator Theory
Before proceeding to our main result, we first introduce a theorem due to Du
(1989), which studies the fixed point properties of monotone concave operators
on a partially ordered Banach space.
Let E be a real Banach space on which a partial ordering is defined by
a cone P ⊂ E, in the sense that x ≤ y if and only if y − x ∈ P . If x ≤ y
but x 6= y, we write x < y. An operator A : E → E is called an increasing
operator if for all x, y ∈ E, x ≤ y implies that Ax ≤ Ay. It is called a
concave operator if for any x, y ∈ E with x ≤ y and any t ∈ [0, 1], we have
A (tx+ (1− t)y) ≥ tAx + (1 − t)Ay. For any u0, v0 ∈ E with u0 < v0, we
can define an order interval by [u0, v0] := {x ∈ E : u0 ≤ x ≤ v0}. We have the
following theorem (see, e.g., Guo et al., 2004, Theorem 3.1.6 or Zhang, 2013,
Theorem 2.1.2).
Theorem 3.1 (Du, 1989). Suppose P is a normal cone8, u0, v0 ∈ E, and
u0 < v0. Moreover, A : [u0, v0]→ E is an increasing operator. Let h0 = v0 − u0.
If A is an concave operator, Au0 ≥ u0 + h0 for some  ∈ [0, 1], and Av0 ≤ v0,
then A has a unique fixed point x∗ in [u0, v0]. Furthermore, for any x0 ∈ [u0, v0],
Anx0 → x∗ as n→∞.
This theorem gives a sufficient condition for the existence, uniqueness, and
global stability of the fixed point of an operator without assuming it to be a
contraction mapping. It is particularly useful in cases where we study a monotone
concave operator but the contraction property is hard or impossible to establish.
This is the case in our model. The operator T is not a contraction9 because the
transaction cost coefficient δ is greater than 1, but as will be shown below, T is
actually an increasing concave operator.
Based on Theorem 3.1, we have the following theorem.
8A cone P ⊂ E is said to be normal if there exists δ > 0 such that ‖x + y‖ ≥ δ for all
x, y ∈ P and ‖x‖ = ‖y‖ = 1.
9To be more rigorous, T is not a contraction under the supnorm, but it might be a
contraction in some other complete metric. In fact, Bessaga (1959) proves a partial converse of
the Contraction Mapping Theorem, which ensures that under certain conditions there exists a
complete metric in which T is a contraction. Also see Leader (1982); for the construction of
such metrics, see Janos (1967) and Williamson and Janos (1987). For an application of this
theorem in the economic literature, see Balbus et al. (2013). We wish to thank an anonymous
referee for referring us to this literature.
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Theorem 3.2. Let u0(s) = c
′(0)s, v0(s) = c(s), and [u0, v0] be the order interval
on C(X) with the usual partial order. If Assumption 2.1 and 2.2 hold, then T has
a unique fixed point p∗ in [u0, v0]. Furthermore, Tnp→ p∗ for any p ∈ [u0, v0].
This theorem ensures that there exists a unique price function in equilibrium
and it can be computed by successive evaluation of the operator T on any
function located in that order interval10. Furthermore, as is clear in the proof
(see Appendix A), the existence of the minimizers t∗(s) and k∗(s) can also be
proved, although they might not be single valued for some s.
3.2. Properties of the Solution
In the case where each firm can only have one upstream partner, the equi-
librium price function is strictly increasing and strictly convex (Kikuchi et al.,
2018). In this model, however, complications arise since firms at different stages
might choose to have different numbers of upstream partners. In fact, the
equilibrium price is usually piece-wise convex due to this fact. An example11
of the equilibrium price function is plotted in Figure 1 where c(s) = e10s − 1,
g(k) = β(k − 1) with β = 50, and δ = 10. As is shown in the plot, the price
function as a whole is not convex, but it is piece-wise convex with each piece
corresponding to a choice of k. Monotonicity of p∗ remains true.
Proposition 3.3. The equilibrium price function p∗ : X → R+ is strictly
increasing.
As for comparative statics, we have some basic results also present in Kikuchi
et al. (2018) about the effect of changing transaction costs on the equilibrium
price function. If either transaction cost (δ or g) increases, the equilibrium price
function also increases.
Proposition 3.4. If δa ≤ δb, then p∗a ≤ p∗b . Similarly, if ga ≤ gb, p∗a ≤ p∗b .
In Figure 2, we plot how the equilibrium price function changes when trans-
action cost increases. The baseline model setting is the same as Figure 1. We
can see that if δ or β increases, the equilibrium price function also increases.
4. Computation
To compute an approximation to the equilibrium price function given δ, c,
and g, one possibility is to take a function in [u0, v0] and iterate with T . However,
in practice we can only approximate the iterates, and, since T is not a contraction
mapping the rate of convergence can be unsatisfactory for some model settings.
On the other hand, as we now show, there is a fast, non-iterative alternative
that is guaranteed to converge.
Let G = {0, h, 2h, ..., 1} for fixed h. Given G, we define our approximation
p to p∗ via the recursive procedure in Algorithm 1. In the fourth line, the
10For the choice of the order interval we also follow Kikuchi et al. (2018).
11The parameterization here is merely chosen to highlight the shape of the price function
and is not economically realistic. The price is computed using a faster algorithm introduced in
Section 4 with m = 5000 grid points instead of successive evaluation of T .
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Figure 1: An example of equilibrium price function.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium price function when c(s) = e10s − 1 and g(k) = β(k − 1).
evaluation of p(s) is by setting
p(s) = min
t≤s−h
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp(t/k)} . (4)
In line five, the linear interpolation is piecewise linear interpolation of grid points
0, h, 2h, . . . , s and values p(0), p(h), p(2h), . . . , p(s).
The procedure can be implemented because the minimization step on the
right-hand side of (4), which is used to compute p(s), only evaluates p on [0, s−h],
and the values of p on this set are determined by previous iterations of the loop.
Once the value p(s) has been computed, the following line extends p from [0, s−h]
to the new interval [0, s]. The process repeats. Once the algorithm completes,
the resulting function p is defined on all of [0, 1] and satisfies p(0) = 0 and (4)
for all s ∈ G with s > 0.
Now consider a sequence of grids {Gn}, and the corresponding functions
Algorithm 1 Construction of p from G = {0, h, 2h, ..., 1}
p(0)← 0
s← h
while s ≤ 1 do
evaluate p(s) via equation (4)
define p on [0, s] by linear interpolation of p(0), p(h), p(2h), . . . , p(s)
s← s+ h
end while
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Figure 3: Computation time comparison for the two methods.
{pn} defined by Algorithm 1. Let Gn = {0, hn, 2hn, . . . , 1} with hn = 2−n. In
this setting we have the following result, the proof of which is given in Appendix
B.
Theorem 4.1. If Assumption 2.1 and 2.2 hold, then {pn} converges to p∗
uniformly.
The main advantage of this algorithm is that, for any chosen number of
grid points, the number of minimization operations required is fixed, and we
can improve the accuracy of this algorithm by increasing the number of grid
points. For the iteration method, however, the rate of convergence is different
for different model settings and to achieve the same accuracy it usually requires
longer computation time.
In Figure 3, we plot the computation time12 of successive iterations of T
with p0 = c (method 1) and Algorithm 1 (method 2) for ten different model
settings when the number of grid points is set to be m = 1000. The first and
last five models are the same13 except δ = 1.1 for the former and δ = 1.01 for
the latter. In each model, we also compute an accurate price function using
Algorithm 1 with a very large number of grid points (m = 50000) and compare
it with results from both methods when m = 1000. We find that the error from
method 2 is comparable or smaller than that from method 1 in each model. The
algorithm achieves more accurate results at a much faster speed. As we can see
in Figure 3, method 2 completes the computation in around 3 seconds in each
model while the computation time of method 1 ranges from 7 seconds to more
than 2 minutes. The speed difference is especially drastic when δ is close to 1,
since it takes T more iterations to converge with smaller δ but the number of
operations for the algorithm is fixed. In model 1 with δ = 1.01, the algorithm is
40 times faster than successive iterations of T !
12The computations were conducted on a XPS 13 9360 laptop with i7-7500U CPU. The
program only utilizes a single core.
13The cost function c and additive transaction cost function g for the five models are:
(1) c(s) = e10s − 1, g(k) = k − 1; (2) c(s) = es − 1, g(k) = 0.01(k − 1); (3) c(s) = es2 − 1,
g(k) = 0.01(k−1); (4) c(s) = s2+s, g(k) = 0.01(k−1); (5) c(s) = es+s2−1, g(k) = 0.05(k−1).
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5. Stochastic Choices
So far we have discussed the case in which each firm can choose the optimal
number of upstream partners according to (1). In reality, however, firms usually
face uncertainty when choosing their partners. The result is that some firms
might choose fewer or more partners than what is optimal. For instance, a
firm might not be able to choose a certain number of upstream partners due to
regulation or failure to arrive at agreements with potential partners. Conversely,
the upstream partners of a firm might experience supply shocks and fail to meet
production requirements, causing it to sign more partners than what is optimal
and bear more transaction costs. In this section, we model this scenario and
incorporate uncertainty into each firm’s optimization problem.
We assume that each firm chooses an amount of “search effort” λ and the
resulting number of upstream partners follows a Poisson distribution14 with
parameter λ that starts from k = 1. In other words, the probability of having k
partners is
f(k;λ) =
λk−1e−λ
(k − 1)!
when λ > 0. We also assume that when λ = 0, Prob(n = 1) = 1, that is, each
firm can always choose to have only one upstream partner with certainty. For
example, if a firm chooses to exert effort λ = 2.5, the probabilities of it ending
up with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 partners are, respectively: 0.08, 0.2, 0.26, 0.21, 0.13. One
characteristic of the Poisson distribution is that both its mean and variance
increase with λ, which makes it suitable for our model since the more partners a
firm aims for, the more uncertainty there will be in the contracting process.
Hence, a firm at stage s solves the following problem:
min
t≤s
λ≥0
{
c(s− t) + Eλk [g(k) + δkp(t/k)]
}
(5)
where Eλk stands for taking expectation of k under the Poisson distribution with
parameter λ. Specifically,
Eλk [g(k) + δkp(t/k)] =
∞∑
k=1
[g(k) + δkp(t/k)] f(k;λ).
Similar to Section 3, we can define another operator T˜ : C(X)→ R(X) by
T˜ p(s) := min
t≤s
λ≥0
{
c(s− t) + Eλk [g(k) + δkp(t/k)]
}
. (6)
As will be shown in Appendix C, all of the above results still apply in the
stochastic case and we summarize them in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let u0(s) = c
′(0)s, v0(s) = c(s). If Assumption 2.1 and 2.2 hold,
then the operator T˜ has a unique fixed point p˜∗ in [u0, v0] and T˜np→ p˜∗ for any
p ∈ [u0, v0]. Furthermore, p˜n from Algorithm 1 converges to p˜∗ uniformly.
14Note that in the usual sense, if a random variable X follows the Poisson distribution, X
takes values in nonnegative integers. Here we shift the probability function so that k starts
from 1.
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(d) β = 0.0005, δ = 1.05, θ = 1.15
Figure 4: Production networks with stochastic choices of upstream partners
By Theorem 5.1, there exists a unique equilibrium price function p˜∗ and we
can compute it either by successive evaluation of T˜ or by Algorithm 1. The
algorithm is particularly useful here since it now takes much longer time to
complete one minimization operation with firms choosing continuous values of λ
instead of discreet values of k.
Similarly, there exist minimizers t∗ and λ∗ so that firm at any stage s has
an optimal choice t∗(s) and λ∗(s). With the optimal choice functions, we can
compute an equilibrium firm allocation recursively as in Kikuchi et al. (2018).
Specifically, we start at the most downstream firm at s = 1 and compute its
optimal choices t∗ and λ∗. Next, we pick a realization of k according to the
Poisson distribution with parameter λ∗ and repeat the process for each of its
upstream firm at s′ = t∗/k. The whole process ends when all the most upstream
firms choose to carry out the remaining production process by themselves. Note
that due to the stochastic nature of this model, each simulation will give a
different firm allocation.
In Figure 4, we plot some production networks for different model parame-
terizations using the above approach. Each node represents a firm and the one
at the center is the firm at s = 1. The size of each node is proportionate to the
11
size15 of the corresponding firm. The cost function is set to be c(s) = sθ and
the additive transaction cost is g(k) = β(k − 1)1.5. Compared with production
networks in Kikuchi et al. (2018), the graphs here are no longer symmetric since
even firms on the same layer can have different realized numbers of upstream
partners and thus different firm sizes. The prediction that downstream firms are
larger and tend to have more subcontractors, on the other hand, is also valid in
our networks.
Comparing (a) and (b), an increase in transaction cost makes firms in
(b) outsource less and produce more in-house, resulting in fewer layers in the
production network. Similarly, comparing (c) with (a), a decrease in additive
transaction costs encourages firms at each level to find more subcontractors. The
results are more but smaller firms at each level and fewer layers in the network.
Comparing (d) with (a), the difference is a decrease in curvature of the cost
function c, which makes outsourcing less appealing. The firms in (d) tend to
produce more in-house, resulting in a production network of fewer layers.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the production chain model of Kikuchi et al. (2018)
to more realistic settings, in which each firm can have multiple upstream partners
and face uncertainty in the contracting process. We prove the uniqueness of
equilibrium price for these extensions and propose a fast algorithm for computing
the price function that is guaranteed to converge.
The key to proving uniqueness of equilibrium price in this model is the theory
of monotone concave operators, which gives sufficient conditions for existence,
uniqueness, and convergence. This theory has been proven useful in finding
equilibria in a range of economic models as mentioned in the introduction and
can potentially be applied to more problems where contraction property is hard
to establish.
Our model also has some predictions regarding the shape of production
networks and the size distribution of firms. In our extended model with uncer-
tainty, we generate a series of production networks (Figure 4) under different
model settings. A notable observation from this exercise is that increasing the
proportionate transaction cost δ or decreasing the additive transaction cost g
will reduce the number of layers in a network. In the former case, the cost of
market transactions increases; this encourages vertical integration and hence
leads to larger firms along each chain. In the latter case, the cost of maintaining
multiple partners decreases; this discourages lateral integration and leads to
more firms in each layer. This prediction can potentially be tested with suitable
choice of proxies for δ and g.
Another observation is that different model settings lead to different size
distributions of firms. For example, smaller δ seems to lead to more extreme
differences in firm sizes as shown in the comparison between (a) and (b) in
Figure 4. The underlying mechanism is unclear in our model, which provides a
possible channel for future research.
15Here the firm size is calculated using its value added c(s− t∗)+g(k) where k is a realization
of the Poisson distribution with parameter λ∗.
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A notable feature of our model is that firms are ex-ante identical but ex-
post heterogeneous in equilibrium in terms of sizes, positions in a network, and
number of subcontractors. However, the cost function c and transaction costs δ
and g are assumed to be fixed throughout this paper. Introducing heterogeneity
into these costs might offer richer implications for firm distribution and industry
policies. We also leave this possibility for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs from Section 3
Let U = N × [0, 1] equipped with the Euclidean metric in R2 and X be
equipped with the Euclidean metric in R. To simplify notation, we can write T
as
Tp(s) = min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
fp(s, k, t)
where Θ : X → U is a correspondence defined by Θ(s) = N × [0, s], and
fp(s, k, t) = c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp(t/k).
Lemma A.1. Tp ∈ C([0, 1]) for all p ∈ C([0, 1]).
Proof. We use Berge’s theorem to prove continuity. By Assumption 2.2, we can
restrict Θ to be Θ(s) = {1, 2, . . . , k¯} × [0, s] for some large k¯ ∈ N. Then Θ is
compact-valued.
To see Θ is upper hemicontinuous, note Θ(s) is closed for all s ∈ X. Since
the graph of Θ is also closed, by the Closed Graph Theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis
and Border, 2006, p. 565), Θ is upper hemicontinuous on X.
To check for lower hemicontinuity, fix s ∈ X. Let V be any open set
intersecting Θ(s) = {1, 2, . . . , k¯} × [0, s]. Then it is easy to see that we can find
a small  > 0 such that Θ(s′) ∩ V 6= ∅ for all s′ ∈ [s− , s+ ]. Hence Θ is lower
hemicontinuous on X.
Because p ∈ C([0, 1]), fp is jointly continuous in its three arguments. By
Berge’s theorem, Tp is continuous on X.
Note that by Berge’s theorem, the minimizers t∗ and k∗ exist and are upper
hemicontinuous.
Lemma A.2. T is increasing and concave.
Proof. It is apparent that T is increasing. To see T is concave, let p, q ∈ C([0, 1])
and α ∈ (0, 1). Then we have
αTp(s) + (1− α)Tq(s) = min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
αfp(s, k, t) + min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
(1− α)fq(s, k, t)
≤ min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
{αfp(s, k, t) + (1− α)fq(s, k, t)}
= min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δk [αp(t/k) + (1− α)q(t/k)]}
= min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
fαp+(1−α)q(s, k, t)
= T [αp+ (1− α)q] (s)
which completes the proof.
Lemma A.3. Tu0 ≥ u0 + (v0 − u0) for some  ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. Define s¯ := max{0 ≤ s ≤ 1 : c′(s) ≤ δc′(0)}. Then we have
Tu0(s) = min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
fu0(s, k, t)
= min
(k,t)∈Θ(s)
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δc′(0)t}
= min
t≤s
{c(s− t) + δc′(0)t}
=
{
c(s¯) + δc′(0)(s− s¯), if s ≥ s¯
c(s), if s < s¯
Since Tu0(s) > u0(s) for all s except at 0, we can find  ∈ (0, 1) such that
Tu0 ≥ u0 + (v0 − u0).
Lemma A.4. Tv0 ≤ v0.
Proof. Choose k = 1 and t = 0. We have Tv0(s) ≤ c(s − 0) + g(1) + δc(0) =
c(s) = v0(s).
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Since P = {f ∈ C(X) : f(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X} is a nor-
mal cone, the theorem follows from the previous lemmas and Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. We first show that T maps a strictly increasing func-
tion to a strictly increasing function. Suppose p ∈ [u0, v0] and is strictly increas-
ing. Pick any s1, s2 ∈ [0, 1] with s1 < s2. Let t∗ and k∗ be the minimizers of T .
To simplify notation, let t1 ∈ t∗(s1), t2 ∈ t∗(s2), k1 ∈ k∗(s1), and k2 ∈ k∗(s2).
If t2 ≤ s1, then we have
Tp(s2) = c(s2 − t2) + g(k2) + δk2p(t2/k2)
> c(s1 − t2) + g(k2) + δk2p(t2/k2)
≥ Tp(s1).
If s1 < t2 ≤ s2, then t2 + s1 − s2 ≤ s1. Since p is strictly increasing, we have
Tp(s2) = c (s1 − (t2 + s1 − s2)) + g(k2) + δk2p(t2/k2)
> c (s1 − (t2 + s1 − s2)) + g(k2) + δk2p ((t2 + s1 − s2)/k2)
≥ Tp(s1).
Since c ∈ [u0, v0], by Theorem 3.2, Tnc → p∗ as n → ∞. Furthermore,
since c is strictly increasing, it follows from the above result that p∗ is strictly
increasing.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. If δa ≤ δb, then Tap ≤ Tbp for any p ∈ [u0, v0]. Since
T is increasing by Lemma A.2, we have Tna p ≤ Tnb p for any p ∈ [u0, v0] and
any n ∈ N. Then by Theorem 3.2, p∗a ≤ p∗b . The same arguments applies if
ga ≤ gb.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Lemma B.1. The function pn is increasing for every n.
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Proof. As pn is piecewise linear, we shall prove it by induction. Since pn(0) = 0
and pn(hn) = c(hn), pn is increasing on [0, hn]. Suppose it is increasing on [0, s]
for some s = hn, 2hn, . . . , 1− hn, then we have
pn(s+ hn) = min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s+ hn − t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)}
= c(s+ hn − t∗) + g(k∗) + δk∗pn(t∗/k∗)
where t∗ and k∗ are the minimizers. If t∗ ≤ s−hn, it follows from the monotonicity
of c that
pn(s+ hn) ≥ c(s− t∗) + g(k∗) + δk∗pn(t∗/k∗)
≥ min
t≤s−hn, k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)}
= pn(s).
If t∗ ∈ (s− hn, s], then s+ hn − t∗ ≥ hn. Because pn is increasing on [0, s], we
have
pn(s+ hn) ≥ c[s− (s− hn)] + g(k∗) + δk∗pn[(s− hn)/k∗]
≥ min
t≤s−hn, k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)}
= pn(s),
which completes the proof.
Lemma B.2. The sequence {pn}∞n=1 is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous.
Proof. To see {pn} is uniformly bounded, note that for each n,
pn(s+ hn) = min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s+ hn − t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)}
≤ c(s+ hn) + g(1) + δpn(0)
= c(s+ hn) ≤ c(1)
for all s = 0, hn, . . . , 1− hn.
Due to Lemma B.1, to see {pn} is equicontinuous, it suffices to show that
there exists K > 0 such that pn(s + hn) − pn(s) ≤ Khn for all n ∈ N and all
s = 0, hn, 2hn, . . . , 1− hn. Fix such n and s. If s = 0, pn(hn)− pn(0) = c(hn) ≤
c′(1)hn. If s ≥ hn, denote the minimizers in the definition of pn(s) by t∗ and k∗,
i.e.,
pn(s) = min
t≤s−hn, k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)}
= c(s− t∗) + g(k∗) + δk∗pn(t∗/k∗).
Since t∗ ≤ s, it follows that
pn(s+ hn) = min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s+ hn − t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)}
≤ c(s+ hn − t∗) + g(k∗) + δk∗pn(t∗/k∗).
Hence,
pn(s+ hn)− pn(s) ≤ c(s+ hn − t∗) + c(s− t∗)
≤ c′(1)hn,
which completes the proof.
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Lemma B.3. There exists a uniformly convergent subsequence of {pn}. Fur-
thermore, every uniformly convergent subsequence of {pn} converges to a fixed
point of T .
Proof. Lemma B.2 and the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem imply that pn has a uniformly
convergent subsequence. To simplify notation, let {pn} be such a subsequence
and converge uniformly to p¯. Because pn are continuous, p¯ is continuous. By
Berge’s theorem,
T p¯(s) = min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)}
is also continuous. To see p¯ is a fixed point of T , it is sufficient to show that p¯
and T p¯ agree on the dyadic rationals ∪nGn, i.e.,
lim
n→∞ mint≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)} = min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)}
for every s ∈ ∪nGn.
Fix  > 0. Since pn → p¯ uniformly, there exists N1 ∈ N such that n > N1
implies that
pn(x) > p¯(x)− /(δk¯)
for all x ∈ [0, 1] where k¯ is the upper bound on the possible values of k. It follows
that for n > N1 we have
min
t≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)} > min
t≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)} − 
≥ min
t≤s
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)} − .
Therefore,
lim
n→∞ mint≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)} ≥ min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)} .
For the other direction, there exists N2 ∈ N such that n > N2 implies that
pn(x) < p¯(x) + /(2δk¯)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Then for n > N2 we have
min
t≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)} < min
t≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)}+/2.
Since c, g, p¯ are continuous and hn → 0, we can choose N3 such that n > N3
implies that
min
t≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)} < min
t≤s
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)}+ /2.
Hence, for n > max{N2, N3} we have
min
t≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)} < min
t≤s
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)}+ .
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This implies
lim
n→∞ mint≤s−hn
k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)} ≤ min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s− t) + g(k) + δkp¯(t/k)} .
Therefore, p¯ = T p¯.
Lemma B.4. Every uniformly convergent subsequence of {pn} converges to p∗.
Proof. Let {pn} be the subsequence that converges uniformly to p¯. By Theorem
3.2, to see p¯ = p∗, it suffices to show that p¯ is continuous and c′(0)x ≤ p¯(x) ≤ c(x)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Continuity is satisfied by the fact that each pn is continuous
and pn → p¯ uniformly. To show the second one, we again prove this holds on
∪nGn, and it is sufficient to show that c′(0)s ≤ pn(s) ≤ c(s) for all s ∈ Gn and
all n ∈ N. It is apparent that pn(s) ≤ c(s) (choose t = 0 and k = 1). We show
pn(s) ≥ c′(0)s by induction. Suppose pn(x) ≥ c′(0)x for all x ≤ s. Then we have
pn(s+ hn) = min
t≤s, k∈N
{c(s+ hn − t) + g(k) + δkpn(t/k)}
≥ min
t≤s, k∈N
{c′(0)(s+ hn − t) + g(k) + δc′(0)t}
= min
t≤s
{c′(0)(s+ hn − t+ δt)}
= c′(0)(s+ hn).
Since pn(0) = 0 ≥ c′(0) · 0, it follows that pn(s) ≥ c′(0)s. This concludes the
proof.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 5.1
Similar to Appendix A, we can write the operator T˜ in (6) as
T˜ p(s) = min
(λ,t)∈Θ˜(s)
{
c(s− t) + Eλk [g(k) + δkp(t/k)]
}
where Θ˜(s) = [0,∞) × [0, s]. Upon close inspection, all of the above lemmas
still hold for T˜ if we can restrict Θ˜(s) to be a compact set. To be more specific,
Lemma A.2 and B.1 can be proved in the exact same way; Lemma A.3, A.4, B.2,
and B.4 hold since each firm can choose k = 1 with probability 1; Lemma B.3
and A.1 need the compactness of Θ˜(s). To avoid redundancy, we omit the proofs
and shall only show that there exists an upper bound on the choice set of λ.
Let ν be the median of the Poisson distribution and denote the ceiling of ν
(i.e., the least integer greater than or equal to ν) by ν¯. Then we have
∞∑
k=ν¯
f(k;λ) ≥ 1
2
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by definition. It follows that the expectation of g(k)
Eλkg(k) =
∞∑
k=1
g(k)f(k;λ)
≥
∞∑
k=ν¯
g(k)f(k;λ)
≥ g(ν¯)
∞∑
k=ν¯
f(k;λ)
≥ 1
2
g(ν¯)
where the second inequality follows from Assumption 2.2. Choi (1994) gives
bounds16 for the median of the Poisson distribution:
λ− ln 2 ≤ ν − 1 < λ+ 1
3
.
So we have
Eλkg(k) ≥
1
2
g(ν¯) ≥ 1
2
g(ν) ≥ 1
2
g(λ− ln 2 + 1).
Therefore, we can find λ¯ such that Eλkg(k) ≥ c(1) for all λ ≥ λ¯ and hence Θ(s)
is essentially [0, λ¯]× [0, s] which is a compact set.
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